

Doc. No. 1603A

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Outline of Proceedings of the Investigation
Committee of the Privy Council Concerning
the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Tripartite Treaty.

(Written by MATSUMOTO, Chief
of the Treaty Bureau.)

The session was opened at 11:20 a.m., September
26, 1940 in the HIGASHI-SAN-NO-MA (TN: East Number Three)
Room of the Imperial Palace.

Attendance:

The Privy Council HARA, President of the Privy
Council
SUZUKI, Vice-President of the
Privy Council (Chairman
of the Investigation
Committee)

All Councillors were present as
members of the Investigation
Committee except KANEKO and
TANAKA who were absent.

The Government (TN: Cabinet) KONOE, Prime Minister
MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister
TOJO, War Minister
OIKAWA, Navy Minister
KAWADA, Finance Minister
HOSHINO, President of
the Board of
Planning.

Moreover, the following persons were present as
exponents.

MURASE, President of the Bureau of Legislation
MORIYAMA, Chief of the Second Section
MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Treaty Bureau
MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau
(TN: Army)
ABE, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau
(TN: Navy)
HARAGUCHI, Chief of the Exchange Bureau
MATSUKUMA, Chief of the Bureau of Banks
TSUJI, Chief of the Superintendent Bureau

Proceedings:

1. The chairman of the committee announced the opening
of the session and had the secretary read the draft of the
treaty.

2. Prime Minister KONOE delivered a formal address as per separate paper No. A.

3. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA gave an explanation as per separate paper No. B.

4. Interpellation began according to rank.

Councillor KAWAI: I thoroughly understood the spirit of the draft. Personally, I have been desiring the conclusion of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance, and I have been expecting its speedy realization since Minister MATSUOKA came into office. Although I have heard talks amongst some factions that the activity of MATSUOKA was slacking, it is a great pleasure to see the treaty being at last concluded. According to the explanation just made by Minister MATSUOKA, the attitude of ITALY is not clarified. I ask your reply on this point.

Minister MATSUOKA: As I have just explained, negotiations of this treaty began between JAPAN and GERMANY. GERMANY said at the beginning that she would be responsible for ITALY. Yesterday the Italian Ambassador called upon me and informed me, according to his home government's instruction, that ITALY has entrusted to GERMANY everything concerning negotiations of the treaty and that ITALY would express wholeheartedly her approval of a draft of the treaty concluded between JAPAN and GERMANY.

Councillor KAWAI: Glancing over the exchange of statements appended to the treaty, I found that it was concerned only with the relations between JAPAN and GERMANY. However, is it not necessary to make a similar exchange with ITALY?

Minister MATSUOKA: As a fact, I think we should attach importance to GERMANY in every point and it would not hurt to consider ITALY as secondary. Therefore, I have had the German Foreign Minister state in the exchange of statements that he has absolute confidence in that, when assistance and co-operation of ITALY is desired, ITALY will no doubt act in concert with GERMANY and JAPAN.

Councillor KAWAI: I consider Article III of the treaty most important. Although I do not believe in a Japanese-American war, I think that, if worst comes to worst, the War and Navy Ministers may have something in readiness to avert defeat, and on this point I beg to have an explanation that will reassure us. Moreover, we cannot say definitely that the U.S.S.R. will not start something against JAPAN. In such a case, what attitude will GERMANY take?

War Minister TOJO: I will give my answer chiefly from the standpoint of the Army. If the worst comes to worst, only a small part of the military strength will be necessary to carry out the operation against the U.S.A. I think that you need not worry on this point. However, an operation against the U.S.A. cannot be said complete unless we consider an operation against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, adjustment of JAPAN-SOVIET relations is a very important matter. I think that, if we could accomplish this effectively, military preparation would be eased considerably, but when we consider the character of the U.S.S.R., JAPAN cannot neglect her own preparation. As to the CHINA Incident, we intend to bring it to a conclusion by making efficient use of this treaty before we find ourselves in the worst situation.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since the war preparedness of our present Navy is complete, we will definitely not be beaten by the U.S.A., but in event of a prolonged war, it is necessary that we make sufficient preparations to keep up with the realization of the American plan for repletion of her navy. On this point, the Navy is adopting a policy prudent in every respect.

Councillor KAWAI: I fear nothing so much as the question of our materials. In case of a protracted war, how long will they last?

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: As I explained yesterday (the President gave a detailed explanation of the material mobilization plan at the regular meeting of the Privy Council on the previous day), our country has for the last few years been making preparations for self-sufficiency as regards materials. Out of 2,100,000,000 yen in imports, 1,900,000,000 yen is received from ENGLAND and the U.S.A. If, therefore, the economic pressure is strengthened, it is necessary that we act prudently considering the activation of Article III of the treaty. As for iron, this year's output is expected to be 5,200,000 tons, and even at the worst we can expect an output of 4,000,000 tons. At present, 1,500,000 tons are used for armaments and military purposes, and the rest is allotted for the repletion of productive power and for private and governmental use. If we manipulate the repletion of productive power, and restrict private and governmental demands, giving consideration to cases when imports of scrap iron and iron material may be stopped, we shall not find

curselves in so serious a situation. As regards metals other than iron, the case is different, but I think that you need not be seriously concerned, for we are now endeavouring to collect them from all parts of the world. Most important is petroleum. We are at present depending greatly on AMERICA, especially for aviation gasoline, almost all of which we must import from AMERICA. We must try to increase its production at home and, at the same time, must find means to secure it from places other than AMERICA. Recently, we have accumulated a considerable "stock" of aviation petroleum. However, in case of a prolonged war with the U.S.A., a self-sufficient supply cannot be obtained solely in JAPAN, MANCHURIA, and CHINA, whereas iron and other metals can be so obtained. Therefore, it is necessary that we speedily secure the right to obtain oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO. This matter has been touched upon in the recent talk with GERMANY. Furthermore, you must understand that at present negotiations are being carried on for the peaceful acquisition of oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Councillor KAWAI: In regard to petroleum, at yesterday's talk the military and naval authorities too implied that considerable preparations have been effected. I wish to have some explanation by the War Minister and the Navy Minister.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: As for the Navy, we have made preparations for a considerable length of time. Measures are now being taken regarding synthetic oil.

War Minister TOJO: The Army has prepared so that its materials may last for a considerable period. If an unusually prolonged war should occur, consideration must be given to oil for aircraft and mechanized units.

Recess.

Reopened at 1:10 p.m.

Councillor ISHII: In case a power is attacked, are we bound to enter into war immediately according to Article III? Has there been an agreement as regards this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In the exchange of statements, it reads: "It is understood that the deliberation of the three signatories will decide whether or not one of the contracting parties has been attacked in the sense of Article III of the treaty." (Letter from the German Ambassador at TOKYO.) This was inserted at my request so

as to clarify the point now in question. If the existence of an attack is deliberated and affirmed, the signatories are automatically bound to fight in co-operation. The time and the manner of assistance are to be decided upon by each of the respective signatories independently and then be referred for deliberation.

Councillor ISHII: I agree with the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, since the term "immediately" is lacking in the text. Furthermore, I have interpreted the joint special committee of Article IV to mean a conference of military specialists as in the case of ordinary treaties of alliance, but according to the explanation given just now by the Foreign Minister, it seems that economic problems would also be discussed by the committee. I would like to hear the explanations on this point.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: At first, it was planned to have this matter provided for in the annexed secret protocol of the treaty. According to the said plan, a joint committee of the Army and Navy was to be established, one in TOKYO, and one in BERLIN or ROME. In addition, an economics committee was also to be set up, but it was decided not to draw up a secret protocol. This point I should like to have deliberated and decided between the two countries after the treaty is concluded. Since a committee to handle economic problems is thought to be necessary, it should be established.

Councillor ISHII: In this treaty there is no provision, such as almost always exists in treaties of alliance, regarding the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Is there any special object in this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I did not mention anything on this matter. To tell the truth, I thought that if the other party spoke of it, I would not object to its insertion, but if the other party did not touch on this subject, I considered it better not to have this provision. The reason is that, according to my idea, the object of this treaty was to prevent war and not to make war. Therefore, one of the reasons was that it was preferable not to have a provision for the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which anticipated the outbreak of war. Another reason was that in event a war should break out, I thought this question might be settled by reaching mutual agreement in the early stage of the war. Therefore, I did not propose this.

Councillor ISHII: Your opinions are quite right. However, Article I of the treaty speaks of the new order in EUROPE, but unless what is meant by the new order in EUROPE is made clear, how are we to know clearly the obligation of JAPAN? Were any understandings given in this respect?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Although your question is reasonable, I think the meaning of the new order was fully expressed in the preamble. The preamble was our proposal and not a single word of amendment was made by the Germans.

Councillor ARIMA: I agree with government in its desire to avert an American-Japanese war as demonstrated by this treaty, but if JAPAN and the UNITED STATES are destined to fight, I think now is the best time. However, what concerns us most is our lack of petroleum. Although the Navy Minister said that we have made appropriate preparations, it cannot be supposed that, if hostilities began between JAPAN and the U.S.A., they would terminate in one or two years. Particularly since we are bound to use great quantities of petroleum in modern wars, we cannot help worrying whether or not synthetic petroleum and such will suffice in critical times. Therefore, I would like to have a reply on this point from the Navy Minister.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since we have just started with synthetic petroleum, we cannot say that it will suffice in critical times. Therefore, there is no other way than to acquire it from the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO through peaceful means, and it is quite likely this will occur. Consequently, when viewed from this point, I think adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R. is very important. On the other hand, if the war is prolonged the Navy must consider the economic use of petroleum.

Councillor ARIMA: Would there be a sufficiency of petroleum of high octane rating?

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Yes, in regard to petroleum of high octane rating, the Navy has lately established a special research organ and has been producing it through methods original with the Navy. Moreover, considerable store is on hand.

Councillor KUBOTA: Perusing the wording of Article III of the treaty, we can conceive the U.S.S.R. to be included among countries not participating at present in the European War and the Sino-Japanese dispute. What is the

relation between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.? Were there any conversations between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In order to avoid that doubt, we established Article V. In reply to my inquiry whether any conversation was held with the U.S.S.R. concerning this treaty, STAHLER gave a negative answer. However, I am inclined to think STAHLER talked with the Russians when he passed through MOSCOW. There is one fact which seems to prove this; that is, on August 23, when STAHLER left BERLIN, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP who happened to have an interview with Ambassador KURUSU on the same day made no reference to this matter. However, on the 24th when STAHLER had an interview with Ambassador TOGO, he said that GERMANY intended to conclude a political treaty with JAPAN. From this, it could be conceived that STAHLER had some conversation with the Soviet authorities during that period.

Councillor KUBOTA: We hear rumors of rapprochement between the UNITED STATES and the U.S.S.R. Is there any fear of this treaty accelerating this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As regards the rapprochement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Foreign Ministry has been vigilant and has endeavored to secure the real facts from all quarters, but up to now we have not come in contact with any information deemed authentic, and I think that there is still nothing concrete at the present. Furthermore, STAHLER stated very clearly the possibility of meeting success in the adjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations, and has proposed the services of GERMANY as mediator. This point is identical to those as stated in the exchange of statements.

Councillor ISHIZUKA: I have no objection in regard to the text of the treaty. However, as to the relations with GERMANY, we cannot put 100% confidence in her, when we consider the record of the past. At the time the Anti-comintern Pact and the Cultural Pact were concluded, there were opinions that complete unity was impossible, except in special instances. We expect the government to take this into full consideration and put the treaty into effectual operation.

Councillor SHIMIZU: Who were they who signed this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: RIBBENTROP, CIANO, and Ambassador KURUSU.

Councillor SHIMIZU: This treaty is being put into force simultaneously with its signing. Do you think that it is in accord with the constitution?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There are many previous examples of treaties like this, and there is no danger of any constitutional difficulties, because it was sanctioned by the Emperor after being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation before it was signed.

Councillor SHIMIZU: According to what I hear there are several German engineers still in CHUNGKING. Is it true?

War Minister TOJO: There are such reports, but the truth is not clear.

Councillor SHIMIZU: It stipulates that some sort of compensation should be paid for our South Seas Mandate. Can you tell me the meaning of this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to this point, the set-up is that all of the former German territories now under mandated rule be returned to GERMANY, and that she cannot allow, as a matter of principle, only JAPAN, her ally, to retain the territories. Therefore, they insisted that they wished to receive compensation and /thereby/ resort to the formality that it had been transferred to JAPAN. At first, the term "adequate" was used with compensation, but due to my insistence, "adequate" was deleted in favor of "in a way". Since GERMANY said that she would be satisfied if this compensation be an entirely "nominal" one--giving examples that there have been cases of only six bags of coffee; what she means is of a very light nature.

Councillor SHIMIZU: In my opinion, I think that there is no need of receiving transfer of the mandates from GERMANY now.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In my opinion, I think the view taken by Dr. TACHI and other authoritative students of international law that there was no cession of territories is right, and therefore, since GERMANY practically denounced

the VERSAILLES Treaty three years ago, it is correct to regard the Japanese Mandatory rule as the continuation of military occupation. Accordingly, I think it is necessary that we receive transfer of the territories from GERMANY and clarify the situation.

Councillor MINAMI: When did ITALY give her approval to this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As I have replied previously, ITALY on the 25th sent her ambassador in TOKYO to call on me to express her approval of the treaty. Prior to this, the German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP obtained ITALY's approval in ROME.

Councillor MINAMI: In that case, don't you think that it was too early to submit this question to the Imperial Conference of the 19th to obtain Imperial sanction when it was uncertain whether ITALY would approve it or not?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Not only had GERMANY repeated from the start that she would be able to obtain ITALY's approval, but since the matter discussed at the Imperial Conference was a question concerning the plan for conclusion of a treaty between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY based on a general plan framed by GERMANY and JAPAN, I do not think that it matters much.

Councillor MINAMI: Has the sphere of GREATER EAST ASIA been clearly defined?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We have talked about it at the time of negotiation and have recorded it.

Councillor MINAMI: What is the particular reason for the exchange of statements when trouble occurred between BRITAIN and JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As BRITAIN is already participating in the European War, Article III of this treaty is not applicable to her; but as for JAPAN, we cannot assert that there will be absolutely no British-Japanese war. That is why we have especially made this point clear, in spite of GERMANY's disapproval.

Councillor MINAMI: Did JAPAN first propose this treaty, or was it GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: GERMANY proposed this treaty first.

Councillor MINAMI: Is it not because GERMANY had failed in her campaign against BRITAIN that she has come to offer such a proposal?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The prolongation of the campaign against BRITAIN may be a reason but this is not the only reason. I think the reason is that GERMANY believed that in the course of half a century or so, complications between AMERICA and GERMANY are inevitable. ✓

Councillor MINAMI: I approve of checking AMERICA by means of this treaty, but is there absolutely no danger of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We are not positive that there will be absolutely no possibility of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition. However, as we cannot overlook the influence of German-Americans in the UNITED STATES with regard to the improvement of Japanese-American relations, we consider this treaty valuable in this respect also.

Councillor MINAMI: I am informed from the answers of the various ministers on the petroleum problem, but I cannot feel secure in the least because it is like hearing through a wall. I would like to have it explained more clearly and feel a sense of security.

President of Planning Board and Ministers of Army and Navy: As replied before, the Army and Navy have a considerable stockpile. The replies by Councillors KAWAI and ARIMA that peaceful acquisition from abroad is hopeful, we repeat here.

Councillor MINAMI: If the Sino-Japanese Incident continues on one hand, and if war between JAPAN and AMERICA should break out on the other hand, how would the financial situation be? I would like the Finance Minister to answer this question?

Finance Minister KAWADA: It goes without saying that JAPAN will have her finances constrained. There will be no other way, after all, than to increase the savings of the people and try to cut down the government expenditure.

Councillor MINAMI: Next, I would like to hear about the Russo-Japanese relations. If a Japanese-American War should break out, it would be conceived that hands for co-operation by both JAPAN and the U.S.A. will be extended to the U.S.S.R. just as it had been done by the Anglo-French and by the Germans before the European War. Therefore, in consideration

of the Japanese-American relations, can't we first of all adjust our relations with the Soviet and thereafter carry on negotiations on this treaty? Why is it that we must only comply to the words of the Germans and defer the negotiation with the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., proposal for a neutrality pact had been made during the former Cabinet. I, myself, after assuming office, have tried 'feelers', but the state of affairs were that the U.S.S.R. gave reply of acceptance on condition that the proposal of the former Cabinet will be accepted provided that the "PORTSMOUTH" Treaty be rescrutinized, the rights and interests in NORTH SAGHALIEN be returned, etc., presenting conditions which almost had to be rejected. Thus, I came to the conclusion that in the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., there is no other way than to utilize GERMANY. That is why I accepted GERMANY's proposal to this treaty.

Councillor MINAMI: It is said that STAHLER told the Foreign Minister that the UNITED STATES will not participate in the European War; but we cannot ascertain how it will turn out after the presidential election. The U.S.A. may revise her neutrality law and may assist BRITAIN to the utmost. In such a case, would it mean that the U.S.A. will attack GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There is no other way to judge whether the action of the UNITED STATES constitutes an attack or not, except through the situation at that time. Regarding this point, GERMANY suggested during the negotiation that it was desirable to have in Article III the attack as being made "openly or covertly"..... To this we insisted that we wished to eliminate such words because in the words "the attack being made covertly", there would be a fear of including such things as the transfer of American destroyers to BRITAIN in its meaning. There had been cases when GERMANY explained that those words were inserted rather for the interest of JAPAN. For instance, when the UNITED STATES Fleet enters SINGAPORE, it could be said that a covert attack has been made, and, therefore, the transfer of destroyers would not be included in this interpretation.

Councillor MINAMI: At the meeting with the Germans, did you repeat the fact that they are to exert their efforts in order to have the U.S.S.R. discard their policy of assisting CHIANG KAI SHEK?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I, as Foreign Minister, have given full consideration to this point and have thought of letting GERMANY, through the U.S.S.R., lead CHUNGKING to terms of peace. However, to have suggested this matter too early would have bared our weak points to GERMANY, and thus it would have caused us many disadvantages without a single advantage. Therefore, even during the early part of August when I had an interview with Ambassador OTT, when he mentioned something of this purport, I told him that JAPAN intended to dispose of the CHINA Incident unaided. Of course, it was my intention to make full use of this treaty hereafter to adjust JAPAN-SOVIET diplomatic relations and find means to promote the settlement of the CHINA Incident.

Councillor NARA: No questions.

Councillor ARAKI inquired about the quality, physical vitality, and the health of the Army and Navy, and especially about the prevention of tuberculosis, etc., to which both the War and Navy Ministers made replies.

Councillor MATSUI: No questions.

Councillor SUGAWARA: I wish to present questions on five points. (1) A little while ago the Foreign Minister spoke of a secret protocol, but were there any suggestions regarding the drawing up of a secret protocol? (2) What connections are there between this treaty and the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Anti-Comintern Pact? (3) Although this treaty is a tripartite pact, the relations between GERMANY and ITALY are so close that when a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of the treaty, don't you think that there is fear of the odds always being two to one against us? (4) In regard to our relations with ITALY, is it completely unnecessary to have it in writing? (5) Although there were explanations a while ago regarding preparedness from the military standpoint in case a war should break out with the UNITED STATES, we are most of all anxious about the financial problem. Although we believe that the Finance Minister is fully prepared on this point, what is the actual situation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: (1) During the negotiations, proposals for a secret protocol were made, but the contents of the secret protocol became unilateral, including only the demands made by JAPAN. In order to make this perfect, it not only takes time, but it also needs the approval of ITALY. Therefore, we avoided drawing up the secret protocol and decided that I, the Foreign Minister, exchange statements with the German Ambassador in TOKYO and use this in place of the secret protocol. (2) The Anti-Comintern Pact will remain as it now stands. I think that JAPAN must maintain her great

policy of defense against communism irregardless of whatever relations she may have with the U.S.S.R. (3) Although it is true that German-Italian relations are close, I consider it needless to be anxious about whether ITALY's feelings toward JAPAN are greater than those toward GERMANY. (4) I think there is no special need for any document. The Italian Ambassador has quite clearly given the approval of the Italian Government.

Finance Minister KAWADA: In regard to the fifth question presented by Councillor SUGAWARA, I intend to take measures so as to avoid as much as possible the increase of burden on the people.

Councillor MATSUURA: The purport of this treaty is to check the aggravation of Japanese-American relations. I myself desire this most. However, if unfortunately worst comes to worst, I request that adequate preparations be made to meet this situation.

Councillor USHIO: Questions were asked regarding the domestic situation, food problems, etc., if worst came to worse. The President of the Planning Board answered this.

Councillor HAYASHI: Although the principal object of the treaty is concerned with Japanese-American relations, I think it is necessary to give most careful consideration to Soviet relations at this time. According to the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, I had the impression that he possessed an optimistic view in regard to our relations with the U.S.S.R., but from the information I have on hand, there are grounds for considerable pessimism in regard to the future of relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R. and between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. For instance, last year when the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, the contents of the instruction STALIN gave to the Communists were, according to the reliable information I have, that STALIN stated that the recent coalition between the U.S.S.R. and GERMANY was a means to bolshevize western EUROPE. He further stated that this did not mean that the eastward expansion policy had been discarded, and that when the opportune time arrived, the U.S.S.R. intended to take positive action. In regard to these points, what are the ideas of the Foreign Minister?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I also do not think the adjustment of JAPAN-U.S.S.R. relations to be so easy. However, we must acknowledge that GERMANY can exert considerable pressure on the U.S.S.R. According to the reliable information I have, one of the most important motives for the U.S.S.R.'s

severance from ENGLAND and FRANCE to act in concert with GERMANY last year, is that HITLER is said to have told STALIN that GERMANY would attack the U.S.S.R. if she did not accede to German demands. Judging from these, I think it would be very effective to have GERMANY act as intermediary in adjusting the relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: In the case of Article III of the treaty; that is, in the event of a Japanese-American War, what sort of military assistance can GERMANY give to JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: That was also discussed during the negotiations and GERMANY declared that she would supply JAPAN with new weapons and so forth, even prior to the outbreak of the situation mentioned in Article III, and in the event that a Japanese-American War should break out, she is to hold in check the UNITED STATES in the Atlantic area.

War Minister TOJO: The most important assistance would be in the receiving of supplies of excellent military equipment under an understanding with the U.S.S.R.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Generally, I have the same opinion as the Army.

Councillor FUKAI: In the relations with the U.S.S.R., what is the meaning that GERMANY is to restrain the U.S.S.R.? Would not such an act be an outright contradiction to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?

War Minister TOJO: From the standpoint of the treaty, it is as you say, but speaking from the standpoint of actual military movements, GERMANY would be able to check the U.S.S.R. At present, although GERMANY is carrying on military operations against ENGLAND, the greater part of her Army together with mechanized units, are maintained within the homeland. This, militarily speaking, is checking the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: Although the Foreign Minister spoke of mutual confidence between GERMANY and JAPAN, the attitude assumed by GERMANY last year at the time of the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact cannot but be said to be that of insincerity. Last September when Foreign Minister ABE, who held a concurrent portfolio, gave an explanation of the diplomatic developments at the present session of the Privy Council, the then Vice Foreign Minister SAWADA stated that the HIRANUMA Cabinet filed a protest to GERMANY pointing out that the German-Soviet Pact was an infringement of the secret pact of the JAPAN-GERMANY Anti-Comintern Pact.

What has become of the result of that protest?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: From what I heard, it is doubtful whether the above protest has had any effect or not, and I think that, perhaps, there was no reply whatsoever from GERMANY.

Councillor FUKAI: I think that insertion of sentiments in our foreign relations should be avoided, and that diplomacy must always be practiced realistically. In the preamble of the treaty it says, "let every nation have its rightful place", but since HITLER's words always give us the impression that according to the laws of nature, the weak are the victims of the strong, do you think that GERMANY will be able to understand the true spirit of this preamble?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The mission of our diplomacy lies in the propagation of the "Imperial Way". We do not act solely for the purpose of advantages or disadvantages in respect of our interests. I think that such thoughts as "the weak are the victims of the strong" should be absolutely rejected.

Councillor FUKAI: I can understand that, if a Japanese-American war is inevitable, emphasis in diplomacy must be laid to either GERMANY or the Anglo-Americans at this time, but the result of concluding this treaty may hasten the Japanese-American war. Therefore, I wish to ask the Prime Minister his determination, whether or not he has the confidence to be able to overcome shortages of munitions and general commodities; the demoralization of thoughts, etc., when he faces them in the most aggravated times.

Prime Minister KONOE: The basic idea of this pact, of course, lies in the aversion of a Japanese-American clash. However, I think that it is necessary for us to show a firm attitude, because if we act humbly, it will only make the UNITED STATES presumptuous. /TN: May also read "...if we make a blunder, the UNITED STATES will become presumptuous"./ If worst should come to worst, I think that the government must adopt policies with firm resolutions on both diplomatic and domestic affairs. The other day when I presented myself at the Imperial Palace to report on this matter, I found His Majesty, the Emperor, also to have possessed a very firm resolution which was most impressive. I hope that this treaty will be satisfactorily executed, even at the risk of my very life.

Councillor FUTAGAMI: Since there has been much discussion from the standpoint of both diplomacy and economics, I would like to ask some questions on some doubtful points on the treaty itself. First of all, on the point of formality, it

is not clear which of the documents distributed here are for Imperial inquiry. Of these documents, is the Japanese composition the original text? Looking over the contents of the exchange of statements, it seems as if they are international promises. Are these to be submitted for Imperial inquiry?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The only item submitted for inquiry is the draft of the treaty; the others being used only as references. Although the original texts of the treaty will be in Japanese, German, and Italian, for the time being, signatures will be affixed on the English text.

Chief of the Treaty Bureau MATSUMOTO: The attached exchange of statements is different in contents and form, e.g. numbering, from that of the so-called exchange of official documents, which possesses the same effect as the treaty, although it could hardly be regarded as a kind of a so-called international promise. The interpretation of the Pact and the points of agreement between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT were put in writing and, since it was recognized as an extremely important document, it was attached and presented to the Throne as a reference.

Councillor FUTATAGAMI: Such measures as "the affixing of signatures for the time being on the English text" are unusual, and I do not think that such a procedure will be permissible. Furthermore, since the contents of the exchange of statements are a kind of international promise, I think that it must also be presented as an object of inquiry.

President of the Privy Council HARA: In regard to these problems of formalities, I wish to call an informal meeting later.

(After the Investigation Committee adjourned, the government delegates retired, and it seems that as a result of the informal discussion which followed, it was decided that the composition of the draft of the treaty would be the only item to be presented for Imperial inquiry, that for the time being, only the Japanese text of the treaty draft would be examined, that signatures were to be affixed to the English text, and that the point of the later replacement of the texts written in Japanese, German, and Italian would be overlooked.)

Councillor FUTAGAMI: The wording "participating neither in the European War nor the Sino-Japanese conflict...." in Article III of the treaty is an inaccurate expression. It could be interpreted to mean that in case of an attack by a

nation which is neither a participant in the European War nor in the Sino-Japanese dispute, Article III will operate. Can you clarify this point? Next, according to the previous explanation made by the Foreign Minister, the joint special committee could be construed as a compound of military and economics, but does this not mean a compound of the three nations? Furthermore, comparing Article V and III, since GERMANY is bound by the Non-Aggression Pact with the SOVIET UNION, GERMANY cannot attack the SOVIET UNION even in case JAPAN is attacked by the SOVIETS. On the contrary, JAPAN must attack the SOVIET UNION in order to render assistance to GERMANY if GERMANY is attacked by the SOVIETS. Therefore, is this not a unilateral stipulation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The first point of Councillor FUTAGAMI's question is a problem concerned with terminology, but from the practical standpoint of interpretation, I do not think that there is any room for doubt to arise. The second point, of course, means the Joint Committee of the three nations. The argument that Article III, because of Article V, is one-sided against JAPAN, is a disregard of the political significance of this treaty. In such a case as when the U.S.S.R. attacks GERMANY, the political situation now existing between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. will be subjected to a grave transformation, and in such instances, I think that the path for JAPAN to tread will be outside of the scope of the stipulation of this Article. The purport of this Article states plainly that this treaty is not presently aimed against the U.S.S.R.

Councillor MANO: No questions.

Councillor OSHIMA: Was there any understanding regarding the scope of the Greater East Asia?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Of course, there was an understanding, as I have explained this morning.

Councillor OBATA: At this time when JAPAN has not yet solved the Sino-Japanese Incident, if JAPAN is under the obligation to aid GERMANY and ITALY in case the UNITED STATES should participate in the European War, JAPAN will be placed under a very heavy responsibility. On the other hand, I think, the possibility of war breaking out between JAPAN and AMERICA is small. Therefore, will not this treaty be very one-sided?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Whether AMERICA will participate in the European War or not, or whether war between AMERICA and JAPAN will break out or not, I think is a fifty-fifty possibility. Therefore, I do not believe it to be one-sided.

Councillor TAKEGOE: As the result of this treaty being concluded, what kind of support can GERMANY give JAPAN in case worst comes to worst and in case the Japanese Navy aids GERMANY and ITALY, what kind of aid can it give?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Such problems as the kind of help that can be mutually given should be thoroughly investigated at the Joint special committee.

Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI: I think a Japanese-American war is inevitable regardless of whether this treaty is concluded or not. We, therefore, must carefully observe the expansion of the UNITED STATES Navy and must not neglect our preparations corresponding to this.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: We are confident of victory in a quick, decisive war against AMERICA, but as for the future, we are steadily drawing various expansion plans.

Councillor ISHII: I see what is written in the last of exchange of statements is that the South Sea Islands under our mandate will remain a territory of JAPAN, provided that we pay a compensation for them. According to Minister MATSUOKA's explanation of this, since the VERSAILLES Treaty has already expired, JAPAN is still continuing a military occupation of the South Sea Islands. Therefore, although it is said that it is necessary for JAPAN to pay compensation to GERMANY to obtain transfer of the islands, according to the VERSAILLES Treaty, the possession of the mandated islands were transferred to the Five Powers, from which powers JAPAN acquired them. I, therefore, think it is proper to interpret that the islands are already the possession of JAPAN and, therefore, I cannot agree to the verbal declarations of the German Ambassador. Since I admit that this problem is not a subject for Imperial inquiry, I am just expressing my opinion for your information.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: According to the opinion of famous scholars of international law, as Dr. TACHI, a mandate is not a transfer of territory. Therefore, aside from the standpoint of legal theories, and viewing it from the standpoint of practical politics, it has been my opinion for the past three years that it is a better policy to receive these islands from GERMANY through some means. From what I have heard, three years ago, the Japanese Navy had proposed to GERMANY through the naval attache in BERLIN the cession of these islands under certain compensatory terms.

Councillor ISHII: I have exchanged opinions with Dr. TACHI concerning this problem. Dr. TACHI's opinion was only that a mandate is not a cession of territory. In regards to the point that GERMANY transferred them to the Five Powers, I believe there is no dispute. Therefore, I can hardly agree to having JAPAN pay a compensation now to GERMANY for the cession of these islands.

Councillor MITSUCHI: From the questions and answers I have heard throughout this morning, the discussion seems to be chiefly on matters assuming war with AMERICA. However, the moment this treaty is concluded, I think AMERICA's economic sanctions against JAPAN will be greatly increased. In this case, I think the subsistence problem of our people will become serious. Are sufficient preparations made for this? When a treaty of this sort is concluded, the Japanese people are apt to follow GERMANY blindly and there is danger that some may attempt anti-American movements, etc. It is hoped that such acts will be strictly controlled.

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: The government is most concerned over the problems of the people's livelihood and will try to meet the situation most satisfactorily.

Prime Minister KONOE: Since I am in full accord with keeping under control anti-American movements, I intend to carry it out very strictly.

Government officials retired at 7:30 p.m.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 1603

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 45 pages, dated 26 September, 1940, and described as follows: A summary of the proceedings concerning the Pact between the three powers (Japan, German, and Italy), at the Prive Council Meeting. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry - - - - -

Signed at Tokyo on this
19th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
19th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

Doc 1603A.

22. 1030.

第四 日獨伊三國條約ニ関スル樞密院審査委員會議事概要

(松本 條約局長手記)

昭和十五年九月二十六日午前十一時三十分開會

宮中東三ノ間ニ於テ

出席者

樞密院側

原 樞密院議長

鈴木 樞密院副議長(審査委員長)

穴原、金子顧問官及田中顧問官ヲ

除キ全顧問官審査委員トシテ出席

政府側

近衛 内閣總理大臣

松岡 外務大臣

東條 陸軍大臣

及川 海軍大臣

河田 大藏大臣

星野 企画院總裁

他ニ説明員トシテ

村瀬 法制局長官 森山 軍三部長

松本 條約局長

武蔵 軍務局長

阿部 軍務局長

原口 為替局長

松隈 銀行局長

辻 監理局長

22. 1030

2603A.

議事

- 一 委員長開會宣言書記官より條約本文を朗讀せしむ
- 二 近衛總理大臣別紙甲號、通訳抄を述べ
- 三 松岡外務大臣別紙乙號、通訳明を述べ
- 四 戸田首相、質問に入る

河合顧問官

本官、本案、趣旨を完全理解せり本官として、豫てより日獨同盟成立を希望し居りたるに、松岡大臣就任以來其の速なる實現を期待し一部、松岡大臣の活動に主眼を置く論を耳に多かりし今同趣意が成立を見たるに欣快を感ぜられしに、今、松岡大臣、説明に依り伊太利、態度を明かなる處此、其の承り度し

松岡大臣

本件、諸君、先程述べたる通り日獨同盟は始より之を以て獨創、且最初より伊太利、亦ハ引受け居りし中述べ居りたり昨日伊太利大使、本大臣ヲ訪問して伊太利、本件文書、一切、獨創に委ねし日獨同盟、纏りたる條約案を、伊太利、全面的に賛意を表し日本國政府、訓令より申入るべき次第なり

河合顧問官

附屬、交換文書を一覽スルニ日獨同盟、關係、ミヲ述べ居る處伊太利より同様、ミヲ取付くる必要ナキヤ

松岡大臣

案、我々トシテ、日獨同盟ニ重要ト置キ伊太利側ヲ附随し、ミト考へテ互に支ナシト思考ス從テ交換文書、中ニ於テ獨逸外務大臣が伊太利、援助及協力ヲ必要トスル場合ハ伊太利ハ勿論獨逸及日本ト同調スベキトヲ絶対ニ信スル旨ヲ掲ゲらるニ止メる次第ナリ

河合顧問官

條約第三條、且最も重要ト思考ス本官、日

Doc 1603A

米同戦、信じるモノニ非ず、是れ最悪、場合ヲ考慮シテ軍部全
（何等状ヲ取ルガハ又、覺悟アリト信ズル之ニ就テ何等カ本
官等ニ告ベテ與フ様御説明ヲ承ケ度シ又蘇聯ガ日本ニ向テ
事ヲ起サガハモトモ限ラズ此場合獨逸、如何ニ態度ヲ執ルモ
ト考ヘンルヤ

東條陸軍大臣 本大臣は主として陸軍、見ても御同答々最悪、
事態ニ陥リタル際計米作戦ニ要スル陸軍、兵力、極一部分ヲ
使用スル過キ其ノ点ハ御懸念ニ無用ト思考ス然レニ乍ラ計
米作戦（結局村野作戦）考慮セサレバ完全ナリト云ニ雖モ依テ
日蘇、國交調整、極大ニ重要ナル問題ニシテ之ガ有效ニ定
成ニハ陸軍準備、余程樂ニナリト考ヘ得ル處方蘇聯
性格上日本トテ準備ヲ怠ルニ欲スルヲト思考ス高シ那
事變ニ付テハ本條約ヲ有效ニ活用スルコトニ依リ最悪、事態
發生前事變、解決ヲ圖リ度キ考ナリ

及川海軍大臣 現存艦隊、戦備、完成シ居ルヲ以テ決シテ米
國ニ敗ル、取ラガハ戦争ガ長期ニ亘ル場合ハ米國、海軍
充實計畫並、實現ニ伴ヒ我々トシテ充テ、準備ヲ為ス事
アリ此ノ兵ニ付テハ海軍トシテ充テ、策ヲ講ニ居ル次第ナリ

河合顧問官 本官、最モ心配スル所、物資ノ關係ニ於テ長
期戦トナリタル場合トシテ、同、程度トテ御考ナリヤ

星野企畫院總裁 昨日御説明申上ゲタル通り、企畫院總裁
ハ其、前日樞密院定例參集。於テ物資動員計畫ニ付詳
細ニ説明ヲ行（リ）數年前ヨリ我國、諸物資、自給自
足ヲ覺悟シテ準備、來ルハ二十億ノ輸入、中尤貴金屬

Doc/603A

米ニ依存セル有様ニ付故ニ經濟上、壓迫強化、場合條約等
ニ條發動、場合考テ萬全策ヲ講スル必要アリ鐵ニ付テ之
ニ本年ノ生産高ハ五百三十万ト自入ニ付日取要、場合ニ四百
万トハ生産ニ得ル見込ナリ現在庫備立ニ厚薄ニ使用セルモノ百
五十万ト其、他ノ生産力充足ニ民需官需ニ充テルモノトガ
相鉄ニ付テハ場合又ハ鉄材、輸入ノ場合考テ應ニ生産
力充足ニ付加減ヲ加ヘ民需官需ヲ制限スルニ程窮境ニハ立タ
ル見込ナリ非鉄金屬ニ付テハ鉄ニ付テス世界ニ付目下莫
集ニ務メ居ルコト以テ之亦ニ程ニ配テ思フスト思考ス日取重大
ナル石油ニ付現在ハ多量ヲ米國ニ依存シ居リ殊ニ航空機用
揮發油ハ殆ト全部ヲ米國ヨリ輸入ニ仰テ居ル處國內ノ増産
ノ圖ニト共ニ米國以外ヨリ獲得スル方法ヲ講セサルベカラズ日取近航
空油ニ付テハ相當ノストウヲ得タリ然レ共對米戰爭長期ニ亘
ル場合鉄其、他ノ金屬類、場合ト異リ日獨支三國、中ノニ
テハ自足出来ザルニ依リ未得ル限リ東ニ南印又ハ北極太ヨリ
石油獲得權ヲ確保スル必要アリ此、事ニ付テハ今同、獨逸側ト、
話合ニ於テモ問題トナリタル矣ナリ又目下南印ニ於テ平和裡ニ
石油ヲ獲得スル交渉カ行ハレ居ルモノト御了解願出

河合顧問官 昨日、御話、時ニモ石油ニ付テハ軍部ニ於テモ相當ノ
準備アリト云フ意味ニ付申サレタルガ軍部大臣ヨリモ御答辯
願度

及川海軍大臣 海軍トテハ相當長期、準備ヲ有ス又人並石油
ニ付テモ目下施策中ナリ

4

東條陸軍大臣 陸軍、資材ニ付テモ相當、期間、甚ニ得ル様

Doc 1603A.

準備アリ非常ナル長期戦ナリハ航空機用機械に部隊用
油ニ付テ考慮ニ付テモ

石ニ一旦休會

午後一時十分再開

石井顧問官 第三條ニ依リ一國ヲ攻撃セラルニ時、直ニ参戦
義務ヲ生ズルモノナリヤ何等カ此ノ責ニ付テ合テ、クニヤ

松岡外務大臣 交換文書中、「締約國ガ條約第三條、
吾等ニ於テ攻撃セラルニ時、各々、三締約國間、協議ニ依リ
決定セラルベキコトヲ論トス」在東京獨逸大使來翰トナル御
質問、是ヲ明確ナラシムル爲本大臣、要求ニ依リ挿入セラル
モノ、ニ於テ攻撃アリタルニ各々ニ付テ協議、協議纏ヒテ自働
的ニ共同ニ戦ハサルベカラザルニ處何時如何ナルヲモ、依リ援
助スルヤ、締約國各々自主的ニ決定シテ協議スルニトナ次
第ナリ。

石井顧問官 條文中「直ニト云フ字句」モナキニ依リ、外務大臣説明、
自今迄同感ナリ高第四條、混合専門委員會、通常同盟條約
ニ於テ軍事専門家間、協議ト解シ居タルガハ、外務大臣、説明
ニ依リ、經濟的問題モ亦委員會ニ於テ協議スルモノ、如キ處此、
トテニ付御説明ヲ承リ度シ。

松岡外務大臣 本件、最初條約、附屬秘密議定書中、規定スル案
ニナリ居リ、同案ニ依リ、陸海軍、混合委員會ヲ東京ニ一日
林又、羅西ニテ設ケ、其、他經濟委員會ヲ設ケルニトナリ居リ
然レ共秘密議定書、作成セラルトナリ此ノ案、條約成立後兩
國間ニ協議シテ決定致度ニ處經濟問題ヲ扱フ委員會、必
要ト思フモノニ依リ設置スルニトナレトナリ居リ

22re 1603A

石井顧問官 本條約ニ同盟條約ニ非ニ必ズ存在スル
單獨不備和ニ関スル規定ナキ處有、何等カ特殊、思惑
リタル次第ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 本件ハ一切話出サリキ實ハ本大臣トシテ
先方が云ヒ出セバ之ヲ挿入スルモ差支ナシト思考スルガ
先方が之ニ觸レザル場合ニハ之ヲ設ケサル方可ナリト
思ヒタリ何トシテ本條約、本大臣、考ニテ、戦争
ヲ防止スルニ目的ニシテ戦争スルコトが目的ニシ
ザルニ依リ開戦ヲ豫想スル單獨不備和ノ規定ヲ
設ケサル方可ナリト思ヒタルコトガ一理由ニシテ、
他、理由ハ万一戦争が起スルハ此ノ大ニ戦争初期
ニ互ニ約束スルニ宜シト考ヘタルヲ以テ之が規定

方ヲ申出サリシ次第ナリ

石井顧問官 御意見御尤ト存ス尚條約第一條
ニ歐洲ニ於ケル新秩序ト云フコトガアル處何ヲ以テ
歐洲、新秩序ト云フヤ判然タラシメザル日本
義務カ判然タリ得ザルニ非ズヤ何カ此、點ニ付
話合アリシヤ

松岡外務大臣 御尤、質問ト存ズルモ本大臣トシテハ
新秩序ノ意義ハ前文ニテ充分現ハレ居リト
思考ス前文、富方、提案ニシテ獨逸側ハ一字
一修正ヲ申出サリシモノナリ

22ob 有馬顧問官 本條約ニ依リ日米戦争ヲ避ケ度キ、
本官モ政府ト同感ナルガ日米、宿命的ニ戦ハサル

Doc 1603A

シカガサにモ、ナラビ今日が最良*時期ト考へ、
最良に配するに石油、缺乏ナリ、海軍大臣、相違進
備アリト云はタリカ日米開戦ニ一年、二年ヲ要
ニ達スルモノト、田中ニテ殊ニ今日、戦争ニ於テ、極
メテ少量、石油ヲ使用セザルベカラザルモ、人造石
油等モ果シテ急務、間ニ合フモノナリヤに配ニ
堪エザル次第ナリニ付、點重テ海軍大臣ヨリ御
同答ヲ得度シ

又、海軍大臣、人造石油ハ未ダ着年ニシテ許リニ
中々、急務、間ニ合フト、申サズ、依テ平和的義段
ニ依テ、蘭印又ハ、北緯大ヨリ獲得スル他ナク、之ガ成功
スルニ相違有リナリ、從テ蘇聯ト、國交調整ハ
此、点ヨリ云フモ、重要ナリト、極ズ、又一方、海軍トシテ
ハ、長期戦ニナレバ、油、使ヒ延シモ考ヘザルヲ得ス
有馬顧問官ハ、オウタニ價ノ石油ハ、充分間ニ合フ次
第ナリヤ

又、海軍大臣ハ、オウタニ價ノ石油ハ、近年海軍ニ
テ専門、研究機關ヲ設ケ、海軍独自ノ方法ニ製
造シ居リ、又相違、準備モアル次第ナリ

有馬顧問官、條約第三條、文ハ上ヨリ見レバ、現ニ
歐洲戦争又ハ日支紛争ニ參入シ居ラザル國中
ニハ、蘇聯モ合スルモノト考へ、ガ蘇聯ト、關係ハ
如何ナルモノナリヤ、独逸ト蘇聯ト、何等カ話
合アリタリ、次第ナリヤ

No 7

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No 8

松岡外務大臣 其、疑問ヲ避クルニ爲第 五條ヲ認メ
次第ナリ高本大臣ガ「スター」ニ對シテ蘇聯ト、間ニ
何カ本條約ニ付話アリタルヤト訊ネタルニ對シテ
「スター」ハ不定的、回答ヲ爲シ居リタルガ本大臣
ノ想像スル所ニテハ「スター」ハ「マス」通過
ノ際蘇側ト何等カ話ヲ爲シ居ルモト考ヘ居
リ其、證據ト思ハルル、事實アリガ「スター」
ハ八月二十三日ニ伯林ヲ出發セル處同日ベルリン
外相、萊希大使ト、會見ニ於テ何等言及セザ
リ「カ」スター「マス」ハ廿四日ニ東郷大使ニ會見
スル際ニ、独逸側ハ日本ト政治條約ヲ締結スル
積タル日ヲ話シ居ルヲ以テ其、間「スター」ハ
蘇聯當局ト何カ話ヲ爲セルモト思考セラル
佐田顧問良米蘇接近ノ噂ヲ聞ク處本條約ニ
促進スルコトトナシ惧ナキヤ此、其、如何
松岡外務大臣米蘇接近ニ付テハ外務省ニ於テモ
右方面注意シテ真相ノ把握ニ努メ居ル處今
日迄確實ト認ムル情報ニ接シ居ラズ本大臣
ハ未ダ具體的、何物モナシト考ヘ居リ尚「ス
ター」ハ日蘇、國交調整ノ成功ニ付テハ極メ明
白ニ其、可能性ヲ述ビ獨逸ニ轉旋ヲ申出タル次第
ニテ此、其、交換文書ニモ記載サレタル通ナリ
佐田顧問官條約ノ條文トシテ、本大臣ニ於テ思
ハナシ但シ獨逸ト、關係ニ付テハ過去ノ實績ニ

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昭々自明一々信用を置かず。二行方又防共協定
又文化協定締結之際ニモ特殊ノ事項ニ付テ免テ全面
全面的提議ノ不可ナリトノ議論アリキモ此ノ大ニ
政府ニ於テモ充分御同意相成ニ降ル實施ニ
遺憾ナリト期スル所ナリ

清水顧問官 本條約ノ調印者ハ誰ナリヤ
松岡外務大臣「リビニトローゾフ」ナリ」及東栖大使
一三名ナリ

清水顧問官 本條約ノ署名ト同時ニ實施セラル
トナリ居ル處之ニ定憲法上差支ナリト云ハルヤ

松岡外務大臣 斯クモ如キ條約ノ前例无多々ナリ調
印前ニ樞密院ニ御諮詢相成ニ御裁可アルモノナリ
依リ定憲法上ノ問題ハ生ズル所ナリ

清水顧問官 閣下聞ク所ニ依リテ重慶ニ未ダ獨逸人
技師ガ數名居ルト云フガ眞實ナリヤ

東條陸軍大臣 斯カル情報アルモノ實ニ不明ナリ
清水顧問官 我南洋委任統治地域ニ對シテ何
等カノ代償ヲ支拂フコトナリ居ル處如何ナル
譯ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 此ノ案ニ付テハ獨逸側ノ目下未ダ任
統治トナリ居ル舊獨逸領ノ全部返還ヲ要スル運
前トナリ居ル與國タル日本ノ一ニガ之ヲ返還セ
ザルコトヲ認ムルハ原則ノ問題トシテ妥諾ハ得ナ
從テ代償ヲ得テ日本ニ讓渡スルハ形式ヲ採リ

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度ニ主張セリ最初、相當トシテ價 adequateト云
フ字用ナリトテ本大臣、主張ニ依リ in a wayト云
フコトニシタルモノニシテ先方、以テ價、全然、
ナシト云フモノニシテ可ナリ例ハ班班ト成テ、例ニ
リト云フモノニシテ位ニテ極メテ輕キ意味ナリ

清水顧問官 本官、考ニシテ、本大臣、統治ハ、更ニ
ヨリ譲渡ヲ受ケルハ必要ナキモノト云フ

松岡外務大臣 自今、考ニシテ、前ニ於テ、博士其、
有カニ國際法學者、説、セリ領土、割讓、ナリ
シモノト見ル、ガ正シト思ハス從テ本大臣、三年
以來、空ニサレシ條約ヲ獨逸ガ實際上破棄、
ル以上日本、本大臣、統治ハ、軍事占領、繼續ト見ル
、ガ正シク從テ獨逸ヨリ譲渡ヲ受、ニ事能ク明
瞭ニスルハ必要アリト考ヘ居リシク

南顧問官 伊太利、本條約ニ何時承認シタルヤ
松岡外務大臣 先程モ御答合シタル通り伊太利ハ、
五日ニ在東京大使ヲ本大臣、許ニ派遣シテ同意ヲ
表明シ、来リ其、前ニリッヰントロープ、外相、羅
馬ニ於テ伊太利側、同意ヲ取付ケタルモノナリ

南顧問官 然レバ十九日、御前會議、際ニ、伊
太利、同意スルモノトモセザルモノトモ不明ナリトシ
本件ヲ御前會議ニ付、御裁可ヲ仰ギタル時
期頗ル尚早ニアラズヤ

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松岡外務大臣獨逸側ハ最初ヨリ伊太利ノ同意ヲ
 確實ニ得ラルルコトヲ欲スルニ速ニ居ラルルニ
 一ツ御前會議ニテ審議シタルハ日独間ニ應
 對スル方針ヲ附議シタルモノナリニ依リ何等差
 支ナカリシモノト考フ

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南顧問官大東亜ノ範圍ニ係リ明白ナルコトヲ決メ居リザルニアラ
ズヤ

松岡外務大臣 交渉ニ當リ隨時 語ヲ身ニ記録ニ留メタリ
南顧問官 日英間ニ紛争發生シタル場合ニ係リ之ヲ交換文書アリ
如何ナル理由ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 英國ハ既ニ歐洲戰爭ニ參戰シ居ルヲ以テ本條約
ホ三條ノ場合ニ當リ撤消サルモノ日本トシテハ日英戰事ハ絶對
ニナシト云ヒ得ザルニ依リ特ニ此ノ點ヲ獨逸側ノ好マザ
リニ拘ラス明確ニセシメタリ

南顧問官 本條約ハ日本ヨリ言出シタルモノナリヤ獨逸ヨリ
言出シタルモノナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 獨逸ヨリ言出シタルモノナリ
南顧問官 獨逸ガ財力提議ヲ爲スニ至リハ日英作戦ニ失敗
シタル後ニアラズヤ

松岡外務大臣 日英作戦ノ長キタルコトモ一理由ナリヤモ知ラザルモ
石ガ全額ニハ非ズ數十年ノ長キ眼ヲ見テ獨逸ノ石油資源ノ難
シト見ルハ爲テラニ思ハレ

南顧問官 本條約ニ依リ米國ヲ牽制スルコトハ正確ナルニハ米獨
提携ノ危險絶對ニナシヤ

松岡外務大臣 米獨提携ナク敢テ絶對ニナシト思ハレ然レ共
日本關係ノ改善ニハ獨逸米人ノ米國ニ於ケル勢力ヲ無視スル
ザニ依リ此ノ點ニ於テモ本條約ノ價值アリト思ハレ

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南顧問官 石油ノ問題ハ先程ノ各大臣ノ回答ナキニモ礙テ
隔テテ物ヲ聞ク如クモモ安心出来テ今少シ明瞭ナルコトヲ

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承り安心セシメテ度

金書院總裁、陸海軍各大臣 先程モ御答ニタリヨリ陸海
ハ相富野藏アリ海外ヨリ平和的獲得モ有望ナリト河合
有馬兩顧問官ニ對スニ同答ヲ繰返シテ

南顧問官「方ニ於テ日支事變が繼續シテ方ニ於テ日米戦争
が勃発セバ日本ノ財政ハ如何ナルヤ大藏大臣ニ承リ度

河田大藏大臣「財政が窮乏ニナルコトハ勿論ナリ結局國民ノ財
産ヲ増進シ政府ノ部約ヲ圖ル也

南顧問官「次ニ日蘇關係ニ承リ度」高「日米戦争が起リタル
場合蘇聯ハ作モ歐洲戦争等ニ莫佛ト覺レヨリ引張帆ナリタ
ルハ如何日米兩國ヨリ提攜ノ手ヲ差延スコトナレバト思ハル故ニ日米
關係ヲ善フルニハ先ツ蘇聯トノ国交調整ヲ行ヒテ後此ノ條約、
交渉ヲ爲スコトハ出来ザリシモノナリヤ何故ニ蘇聯トノ交渉ヲ
後進ニシテ勿遠ニ命令ニシテ従フモノナリヤ

松岡外務大臣「蘇聯トノ国交調整ニ係リテ内閣時代ニ申シ條約ヲ
提議セリ本大臣モ就任以來探リテ入リ見タルガ蘇側ハ内閣、
提議ヲ受諾スル條件トシテホーソマニ條約ノ再提議、大權、大
權、國收案如ク拒否的ノ條件ヲ附シテ受諾ヲ同意ト来シガ
如キ有様ナリ」施テ本大臣ハ蘇聯トノ国交調整ハ勿遠ヲ利用
スル也トシテ結論ニ達シテ本條約ニ對スル勿遠側提議ヲ受
諾スルナリ

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南顧問官「米國ハ歐洲戦争ニ参加セズト言フコトヲスターム」ハ
外務大臣ニ申シタト言フコトナレモ大統領陸海軍各ハ如何ナルコト
ニナリヤモ知ズ中立法ヲ改正シテ極力英國ヲ援助スルコトニ

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十レヤモ國ヲシテ其ノ場合ハ米國ハ獨逸ヲ攻撃スルニモト十レヤモヤ
松岡外務大臣米國ハ措置直ガ攻撃ト十レヤモヤ其ノ時ノ状況ニ依
リ判斷スル也十レ此ノ點ニ依リテ今尚中獨逸側ハ亦三條ヲ公然ト又ハ
陰密ニ (openly or covertly) 攻撃セシムルニモト云フコトニ改度
シト申出タルニ對シ當方ヨリ陰密ニ攻撃スルトハ例ヘバ米國ハ英國
ニ驅逐艦ヲ讓渡スルガ如キコトヲモ合はぬニハ覺テ依リ斯ルヤ否
ハ削除シタルニモト云フ然レバ先方ハ亦同ノ寧日日本側ノ利益
ヲ三挿入スルニモト云フ例ヘバ米國艦隊ガ新嘉坡ニ入港シタルト云フガ
如キ場合ヲ陰密ニ攻撃スルニモト云フハ驅逐艦ヲ讓渡スルガ如キハ云
ト説明シタル経緯モアリ

南畝閣下官獨逸側トテ話合ハ際ニ蘇聯ヨリテ援豫政策ヲ施スベ
シ爲ニ無難カスルト云フ事ニ依リテ押サレタリヤ

松岡外務大臣此ノ點ハ本大臣トシテモ充分考慮シ居リ獨逸ニミテ蘇
聯ヲ通ジテ重慶ヲ知事ニ尊カニ上ト云フ者居ルニモト十レガ之ヲ最早
ニ言ヒ出スコトハ獨逸ニ脚ヲ見テ言フコトハ利ハズ決ハシテ最初角

初旬ニソコト大使ニ會見ハ際失方ヨリ斯ルニ趣旨ヲ事ヲ申出ニタリ

際モ日米ハ又形勢變ハ獨力ニ片断ニ移リナリト申商置キタル次

オナ素ヨリ今後ハ本條約ヲ命令ニ活用シテ日蘇國交調整支那

事變收拾ハ促進ヲ圖ニ賞悦ナリ

奈良閣下官 復同ナシ

荒木閣下官ヨリ軍ノ素直な力健康状態殊ニ肺結核豫防ニ

復同ナリ陸海軍大臣ヨリ復同答ス

14 松井閣下官復同ナシ

高橋閣下官五ノ點ニ依リテ改度シハ外務大臣ハ先程秘密議

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定書ト云フ事ヲ申サレタルが秘密議定書ヲ作成スルと言フ議ガアリニヤ
 (一) 安保条約ト日独伊防共協定ト関係如何 (二) 安保条約ト三国條約
 トが獨伊ノ関係ハ極メテ秘密ナシト云フ條約ノ解釋等ニ付議
 生ジタル場合等 (三) 二對一トナリ候ナリ (四) 伊太利トノ關係ニ付ハ
 何素文書ト云フニ及ス必要ナキヤ否 (五) 日米戰爭勃發シタル場合ノ
 軍事上ノ覚悟ニ付ハ先程説明アリタルモ最モ心配ナルハ財政上ノ向
 題ナリト云フ點ハ大藏大臣ニ於テモ充分ナル覺悟アリト格別如何
 松岡外務大臣 (二) 交渉中ニ秘密議定書作成議出タルモ秘密議
 定書ノ内容ハ日本側ノ要求ニテ入ルルは秘密トモトナリ之ヲ完全ニ
 スル時日ヲ必要トスルニ付ハ伊太利ノ同意ヲモ取得スル必要アリ
 タルニ依リ秘密議定書ヲ作成シ得テ本大臣ト在京留マ大使ト由ニ
 文書ヲ交換シテ秘密議定書ニ付ツルコトナリタリ決ナリ
 (三) 防共協定ハ其ノ體格置直ニ日本トシテ防共ト云フ本方針ハ蘇聯ト
 ノ關係如何ニ拘ラズ之ヲ收束シ行カザルカラズト思ハス (四) 獨伊ノ
 關係ハ成程秘密ナシモ伊太利ノ日本ニ對スル感情ハ猶以テモ一ツツ以
 テ御心配無用ト思ハス (四) 別ニ文書ヲ要求ザルモトモ伊太利大使
 ハ極メテ明白ニ伊太利政府ノ同意ヲ申出スリ
 河田大藏大臣官原顧問官ノ御實情カ尤モ點ニ付ハ極力國民
 ノ負擔増加ヲ防グ様措置ニ度モ祈リ
 松浦顧問官安保條約ノ趣旨トスル所ハ日米關係ノ惡化ヲ防止スルニ在
 リ本官モ最モ之ヲ希望スル決ナリト云フ事ニ付最モ惡シム場合ナリ
 タル時ニ及スモ準備ハ之ヲ充分整ヘ置ナリ度
 潮顧問官最モ惡シム場合ニ及ビ國內情勢ハ食糧問題等ニ付顧問官
 佐野院總裁ヨリ回答ス

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林銑洞官條約全眼とスル點ハ其米關係ナルガ對蘇蘭爾ハ以際
最モ慎重ニ考慮スル必要アリトナズ外務大臣ノ御説明ニ依リテハ
蘇蘭爾ニハ樂觀的ニ考テ有リ居ルニヤ、印支邊境タルガ本官、
有スル情報ニ依リテハ日蘇國交ニハ獨蘇間ノ關係ノ將來ニハ相違思
キ材料モアリ例バ昨昔獨蘇間ノ關係が締結セラルタニ際スル
リニハ共產黨員ニ對シテ訓示ノ内容ニハ自命ノ有スル確實ナル情
報ニ依リテハスターリンハ蘇聯が今後獨逸ト提携スルハ西歐赤化ノ
手段ナリ又之ニ依リテ東進政策ヲ提議スルニモニアラズ時
期ヲ以テ積極的ニ出テ積リナリト述ベタル由ナルガ之等ノ點ニ依リテ外
務大臣ハ如何御考ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣日蘇國交調整ガ爾等答復ナリトハ自命モ考居
ラズ獨逸ハ蘇聯ニ對シテ相違ノ圧力ヲ加ヘ得ルコトハ之ヲ認めガ
ベカズ自命ノ有スル確實ナル情報ニ依リテハ昨昔蘇聯ガ何故ニ英佛
ヲ離レテ獨逸ト提携スルニ至リヤト云フニ其ノ動機最モ重要ナルハ
ヒトナリハスターリンニ對シテ若シ獨逸側ノ要求ガ容レツザレバ獨逸
蘇聯ヲ攻撃スベト申傳ヘタリト云フコトナリ之ヲモリ判斷ニ
日蘇國交調整ニ獨逸ヲ斡旋セシムルコトハ相違有效ナリト考居
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深井顧問官 條約第三條、場合即チ日米戦争、場合獨逸、如何ナル軍事上、援助ヲ日本ニ與ヘ得ルヤ

松岡外務大臣 右ノ交渉、際ニモ論議セラルガ獨逸、第三條、事能ハ發生以前ニ於テモ新兵兵器ヲ日本ニ供給スベト申シ居リ又日米戦争勃發、場合ハ大西洋方面ニ於テ米國ニ牽制スベトニテリ居リ

東條陸軍大臣 蘇聯ト、諒解、下ニ優待ナル軍用器材、供給シ候ルコトガ最も重要ナル援助ナリ

及川海軍大臣 大体陸軍ト同様ナリ

深井顧問官 蘇聯ニ對シ同條ニ於テ獨逸ヲ蘇聯ヲ牽制スベト、如何ナル意味ナリヤ斯ル事、獨蘇不可侵條約ニ正面ヨリ反スルモノニアラスヤ

東條陸軍大臣 條約上、其ノ趣ナルガ實際、軍事上、動キヨリ云ヘバ獨逸ハ蘇聯ヲ牽制シ得ルモノナリ現ニ獨逸ハ對英作戦ヲ行ヒツツアルモ其陸軍、大部分ヲ機械化部隊ト英國内ニ保有シ居リ之ガ軍事的ニ蘇聯ヲ牽制シ居ル次第ナリ

深井顧問官 外務大臣ハ日獨間、相互信賴ト云フコトヲ申カスルガ獨逸側、昨年、獨蘇不可侵條約締結、際、態度ハ不信ト云フ、外ナシ昨年九月阿部兼攝外相ガ本府ニ於テ外交經過ヲ説明シタル際當時、澤田外務次官ガ平沼内閣ニ於テ獨蘇協定ガ日獨所共協定、秘密協定ニ違反セル点ヲ指摘シ獨逸ニ對シ抗議ヲ提出セル旨ヲ述べタル處有抗議、結果ハ如何ナリ居ルヤ

松岡外務大臣 本大臣、固ク所ニ依リ右抗議、果シテ失才

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ニ通^じ居^るや否^や疑^はら^う然^ら獨^り逸^る側^{より}ハ何^の音^も同^じ答^へナ^らズ
しモト田^中考^へス

深井顧問官 対外國條ニ感情ヲ文^へル^{こと}禁^む物^ニテ外交^ハ、
飽^く遠^く現^現實^的ニ行^はル^べカ^ラズト考^へる^處本^本條^條約^約、前^前文^文ニ
焉^焉邦^邦ヲ^ヲシ^シ各^各其^其、所^所ヲ^ヲ得^得ル^ルト^トア^アル^ルコ^コト^トウ^ウシ^シ、序^序ニ^ニ云^云所^所、
弱^弱肉^肉強^強食^食、自^自然^然、法^法則^則ナ^リカ^ラ、如^如キ感^感觸^觸ヲ^ヲ與^與フ^ルガ獨^獨逸^逸側^側
ニ果^果シ^テ此^此、前^前文^文、趣^趣旨^旨ヲ^ヲ正^正當^當ニ理^理解^解シ^シ居^居ル^ルヤ

松岡外務大臣 我^我外交^交、使^使命^命、自^自皇^皇道^道、宣^宣布^布ニ^ニ在^在リ、利^利害^害得^得失^失
ハ^ハニ依^依リ^テ動^動ク^ルモ、^モニヤ^ヤク^ク弱^弱肉^肉強^強食^食、如^如キ思^思想^想、對^對シ^テ之^之ヲ
排^排棄^棄ス^ルベ^ベキ^キモ^モト考^考ヘ^ル

深井顧問官 日^日米^米戰^戰争^争ヲ^ヲ不^不可^可避^避ト^トシ^シ、此^此、際^際獨^獨逸^逸ヲ^ヲ支^支米^米ヲ^ヲ
孰^孰シ^テ外交^交、重^重點^點ヲ^ヲ置^置カ^カル^ルベ^ベカ^ラズト云^云フ^ルコ^コト、理^理解^解ス^ルモ^モトモ
本^本條^條約^約締^締結^結、結^結果^果ニ^ニ或^或、日^日米^米戰^戰争^争ヲ^ヲ早^早メ^メス^ルト^トナ^ナル^ルヤ^ヤモ^モ知^知
シ^シ、總^總理^理大^大臣^臣、日^日最^最惡^惡、場^場合^合ニ^ニ於^於テ^テ軍^軍需^需品^品、般^般物^物資^資、缺^缺
乏^乏思^思想^想、惡^惡化^化ヲ^ヲ尋^尋、對^對處^處シ^シ之^之ヲ^ヲ扳^扳々^々得^得ル^ル自^自信^信ヲ^ヲヤ^ヤ否^否ヤ
賢^賢悟^悟ヲ^ヲ承^承リ^リ度^度シ

近衛總理大臣 本^本條^條約^約、根^根本^本、考^考ヘ^ル亦^亦、入^入リ^リ日^日米^米、衝^衝突^突ニ^ニ同^同
避^避ス^ルニ^ニ在^在リ^リ然^然、共^共下^下手^手ニ^ニ出^出ス^ルニ^ニ米^米國^國ヨ^ヨリ^リ上^上ラ^ラセ^セル^ル文^文ト^トニ^ニ依^依リ
毅^毅然^然、凡^凡ル態^態度^度ヲ^ヲ示^示ス^ル必^必要^要ト^ト思^思考^考ス^ル万^万一^一最^最惡^惡、事^事態^態ヲ^ヲ
生^生ジ^スタ^タ場^場合^合ニ^ニ於^於テ^テ政府^府、外^外交^交、内^内政^政ヲ^ヲ通^通ジ^テ非^非常^常ヲ^ヲ覺^覺悟^悟
ヲ^ヲ以^以テ施^施策^策セ^セカ^カル^ルベ^ベカ^ラズト考^考ヘ^ル居^居リ^リ又^又日^日本^本大^大臣^臣ガ^ガ參^參內^內本^本
件^件ヲ^ヲ上^上奏^奏致^致シ^シタ^タ際^際、天^天皇^皇陛^陛下^下ニ^ニ於^於カ^カセ^セラ^ラシ^シテ^テモ^モ非^非常^常ニ^ニ御^御
決^決心^心ヲ^ヲ有^有シ^シ遊^遊バ^バカ^カル^ルコ^コト^ト、同^同ヒ^ヒ衷^衷ニ^ニ恐^恐懼^懼感^感激^激ニ^ニ甚^甚エ^ス本^本大^大
臣^臣ト^トシ^シモ^モ身^身命^命ヲ^ヲ堵^堵シ^シテ^テ本^本條^條約^約、遺^遺憾^憾ヲ^ヲ運^運用^用ヲ^ヲ期^期シ^シ度^度シ

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ト考へ居し

ニ顧問官 外交上、經濟上ニ付、大分實答應答下りたる
依り自今ヨリ、條約其、モニ付疑問、占テ領、度ニ先形式、
ト安ニ付、茲ニ配布、書類、中何カ御諮詢ニ付居ルヤ不明
ナリ之事、文書、日本文、本文、テリヤ交換文書、亦モ内容
ヨリ見て、國際約束ト思、ルニ付、御諮詢ニ付、安ニ付、
松岡外務大臣 御諮詢ニ相成リ居ル、條約案、ニ付、他、參
考ナリ、條約、本文、日本文、獨逸文及伊太利文トテ、答
ナルモ、屋敷ヨリ英文、モ、署名スルコトナリ居し

松本條約局長 附屬、交換文書、條約ト同様、效力ヲ
有スル所謂條約文ト、内容並ニ形式(例ニ、番号ヲ付スニ於
テ異リ居ル)所謂國際約束ト、認メ難キモ、條約、解釋及松
岡大臣トテ、大使ト、意見、一致スル、莫ク記載スルモ、ニ、
極メテ重要ナル文書ト認メテ、參考ト、テ上奏案ニ附屬
セシタル次第ナリ

ニ顧問官 屋敷ヨリ英文ニ署名スルコト、ガ如キ、異例ニ、斯
クニ手續ガ許サルト、思、又交換文書、内容、國際約束
ト、以テ之亦御諮詢、容体トスベキモ、ト思考ス

19 原議長 之事形式、問題ニ付、後刻懇談會ヲ開催
スルコト改定シ

(審査委員會終、後政府側退席シ、懇談會ヲ開キ
ル結果條約案文、ニ御諮詢、容体トスルコト並ニ屋敷
ノ條約案日本文、ニ會議シ、英文ニ署名ニ後日、日獨
伊文トスリ、以テ、異ニ、默過スルコトニ決定セル趣ナリ)

ニ顧問官 條約第三條ニ歐洲戰爭又、日支紛争ニ參入
シ居ラザルトアルハ、不正確モ言現、亦ニテ歐洲戰爭又、

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日支紛争、雖又之介入し居る一國が攻害に及ぶ場合に第三
三條が發動される様を取しに及ぶ其の如何次第は專門委員
會との先程、外務大臣、説明に依り、軍事ト経済ト混合様
に之を取らざるが之に三國、混合、意味はアラスカ更ニ第三條ト第三
條トを合さるる獨逸ニ蘇聯ト、間ニ不可侵條約有るヲ
以テ日本が蘇聯より攻害を受く場合ニ獨逸ニ蘇聯ヲ
攻害スルに能はざる之に反シ、獨逸が蘇聯より攻害を受く
場合に日本、獨逸ヲ援助スル爲メ蘇聯ヲ攻害せしむべきに依テ
片務的、規定すべし

松岡外務大臣 二上顧問官、御質問、第一、用語、問題
實際、解釈上の疑義を生ずるに余地なしト田中氏、第二、三國、混
合、三國、混合、委員、會、意味は第三條が第五條、結果日本
ニ片務的ナリト、議論、本條、政治的意味ヲ没却し、之ニ
テ蘇聯が獨逸ヲ攻害スルが如き場合に、獨逸間ニ現存スル政治
的、扶能、重大ナル変革ヲ生ずるモノニシテ斯かる場合は日本、處ス
ル道、本條、規定、範圍外ナリト思考ス本條、趣旨、蓋シ
本條約が蘇聯ヲ目標トし居るナルヲ明示スルモノナリ

眞野顧問官 質問ナシ

大島顧問官 大東亞、範圍ニ付テ、何等の詮合ナリ、ヤ
松岡外務大臣 勿論詮合ナリト、本日午前中説明ニ及
ナリ

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小幡顧問官 日本が日支事変ヲ解決シ居ラザル此
際ニ當テ歐洲戦争ニ米國が参戦シタル場合ニ獨
伊ヲ援助スル義務ヲ負フコトハ極メテ重大ナル義
務ヲ負フモノナルニ反シ日米が開戦スルト云フ可
能性ハ少シト思ハル依テ本條約ハ極メテ片務的
ナルモノトナラザルヤ

松岡外務大臣 米國が歐洲戦争ニ参加スルヤ否ヤ
又日米戦争が勃発スルヤ否ヤハ雖亦五分五分ノ
可能性アリト見テ差支ナシ依テ先初ノモノト
思考セズ

竹越顧問官 本條約締結ノ結果最惡ノ場合ヲ
生ジラルトモ独逸ハ如何ナル援助ヲ日本ニ與ヘ得ル
ヤ又日本海軍が伊ヲ援助スル場合ニ如何ナル
援助ヲ爲スヤ

松岡外務大臣 如何ナル援助ヲ與ヘ得ルヤ等ノ問題ハ
混合委員會ニテ充分研究セザルベカラズ

鈴木審判官 委員會長 本條約ノ成立ト云フニ拘ツテ
日米戦争ハ不可避ト考フルニ依リ米國海軍ノ擴
張ヲ充分監視シテ之ニ相應スル準備ヲ怠ル
ベカラズ

21 及川海軍大臣 差當リ東戰即決デ米國ニ對シ
充分勝算アリ將來ニ付テは省々各般擴張
計畫ヲ目論ミ居ル次第ナリ

No 石井顧問官 交換文書ノ最後ノモノヲ見ルニ

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我委任統治下、南洋群島、依然日本、屬地トスルモ
之ニ對シ代償ヲ支拂フベキト日記載シアリ之ニ對スル
松岡大臣、説明ニヨリバ「サエ」條約、既清
滅シタルモノナルニ依リ南洋群島ハ日本ハ全軍
事占領ヲ繼續セタルニテ從テ日本ハ独逸ニ代償
ヲ支拂ヒテ之ヲ讓受クル必要アリト云フナルモ委任
統治地域ハ「サエ」條約ニ依リ五大國ニ讓渡
セシタルモノヲ日本ガ獲得シタルモノト見ルベク既ニ
日本ノ屬地ナリト解スルヲ以テ正シト自分ハ思フ
ルニ依リ独逸大使ハ頭言言ニ「自分ハ積意ヲ表
シ兼テ尤モ本問題ハ御諮詢外問題ナルヲ以テ
唯御參考ニ自分ハ意見ヲ述ズルニ止メ置キタリ」
松岡外務大臣、立博士等有カナル國際法學者
ノ意見ハ委任統治領土ノ讓渡ニ非ズト爲シ居ルガ故
ニ法理論ヲ別ニテ實際政治問題トシテ「應独逸ヨ
リ何等カノ方法ニテ割讓ヲ受クル方可ナリト云フ
アトガ自分、三年以來、考ナリ聞ク所ニ依リ三
年位前ニ日本海軍ヨリ「伯林ノ海軍式官ヲ通
ジテ独逸ニ對シ一定代償ノ下ニ割讓ヲ申セ
タル趣ナリ」

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No

石井顧問官、本問題ニ付テハ立博士トモ意見
ヲ交換シタルコトアリ立博士ノ意見モ委任統
治ガ領土ノ割讓ニアズト云フ文ヲ獨逸ガ五大國
ニ讓渡シタル事ニ付テハ「年々キ様田」考ス從テ
今更日本ガ独逸ヨリ代償ヲ支拂ヒ割讓ヲ受
ルガ如キハ本官ノ同意シ難キ所ナリ

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三土顧問官 今朝来、質疑応答ヲ聞、ト居、
米國ト、戦争トナリタル場合、コトヲ主トシテ論議セ
ラレ居ル様ナルモ本條締結後直ニ米國、我國ニ
對スル經濟壓迫ハ一層加重セラルモト思考ス
其ノ場合ニ於ケル我國民生活ノ問題ハ重大ナル問
題ナリト思ハル處之ニ付テハ充分ナル用意出
来居リヤ又日本人ノ名角此ノ種ノ條約ガ出
来ルト出逸ガバ、トナリ反米運動等ヲ試ム
ルモノ出デ来ル惧アリ斯カル莫ハ嚴ニ取締リ
頂キタシ

星野企画院總裁 國民生活ノ問題ハ政府トシテ
最も関心ヲ有シ居リ之ガ對策ニ付テハ萬
貴感ナキヲ期シタシ

近衛内閣總理大臣 排米運動ヲ取締ルコトハ極
大ニ同感ナシバ嚴重實施致シタリト存ス

午後七時三十分政府側退場

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證明書

ワシントン文書局 第 一 號
國際檢察部 第一六〇三號

與據及公正之證明

余、林馨、余が下記資格に於て、即ち日本外務省文書課長として、日本政府と公的關係に在ることを、並に該官吏として余が茲に添附せしめる、四六頁より成る、一九四六年一月九日、昭和二十一年九月九日、下記題名、即ち日獨停三國條約關係の樞密院審查委員會議事概要、文書保管に任じ居ることを茲に證明す。
余、更に添附、記録及び文書が日本政府、文書として並に右下記名稱、有又、部局、公式書類及び綴、一部として證明す。(若し之が綴番號又は引用、其他公式書類、綴に於て該文書、正規所在、公式名称を特記すべし)

一九四六年一月九日、昭和二十一年九月九日

東京に於て署名

當該官吏署名欄

右者、公的資格

證人

林

馨

(印)

外務省文書課長

スト、フカ、ル、一音、譯

公式入手之證明

余、リチャード・P・ハリス、余が聯合國軍總指揮官司令部關係に在ることを、並に下記題名、文書、余が公務上日本政府、上記署名官吏より手に入ることを茲に證明す。

一九四六年一月九日、昭和二十一年九月九日

東京に於て署名

氏名欄

右者、公的資格

證人

リチャード・P・ハリス

國際檢察部調査官

I/P. 戸口

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證明書

ワシントン文書局 第 一 冊
國際檢察部 第一六〇三 冊

與據及公正に關する證明

余林馨、余が下記資格に於て、即ち日本外務省文書課長として、日本政
府と公的關係に在ることを、並に該官吏として余が茲に添附せしめる、四六頁より成
る、十九百四十六年一昭和十一年九月十九日、下記題名、即ち日獨停三國條約に關
する樞密院審査委員會議事概要、文書保管に任じ居ることを茲に證明す。
余更添附、記録及文書が日本政府、文書として、並に右下記名稱、省又、部
局、公式書類及綴、一部として證明す。若し之が綴番號又引用其他公式書
類、綴に於て該文書、正規所在、公式名稱を特記すべし。

十九百四十六年一昭和十一年九月十九日

東京に於て署名

並に該官吏署名欄

右者公的資格

證 人

林 馨 (林)

外務省文書課長

スド、ケル、一音譯

公式入手に關する證明

余、リチャード・H・ラニ、余が聯合國軍總指揮官總司令部關係に在ることを、並に上
記題名文書、余が公務上日本政府、上記署名官吏より、今之を添附するを茲に證明す。

十九百四十六年一昭和十一年九月十九日

東京に於て署名

氏名欄

右者公的資格

證 人

リチャード・H・ラニ

國際檢察部調査官

I. P. 戸口

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